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CASE COMMENTS

With the Goss decision the Court has indeed plunged into a
"new thicket." Significant questions remain unanswered, but the Court
has at least suggested its willingness to evaluate the due process rights
of school-age children. The Goss guidelines are far from comprehensive,
even as to school suspensions. Though decisions attempting to follow
these guidelines may therefore produce disparate results, it seems inevitable that the due process rights of school children will be more
closely examined than ever before.
In the final analysis, the Goss ruling on disciplinary proceedings
may prove to be but a minor facet of a larger problem. Goss v. Lopez,
for all its caution, may prove to be the first step towards judicial review of educators' discretion in areas far more complex than student
suspensions. It is at least clear that teachers and school administrators
must begin to consider the due process implications of a wide range
of decisions affecting their pupils' futures.
STEPHEN
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v. State, 302 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 4th Dist.

Ct. App. 1974).
The appellant, an attorney for the public defender's office, was held
in contempt of court for attempting to impeach a critical prosecution
witness. The conviction resulted from the representation of multiple
defendants by the public defender.
V. L. Odums and Clarence Perry had been charged with first degree murder. The public defender was appointed to represent both of
them. Appellant represented Perry; another member of the staff was

assigned to defend Odums. Odums subsequently pled guilty to a lesser
charge. After being sentenced, Odums appeared as a prosecution wit60. Professor Kirp feels a trial-like procedure is necessary to guarantee the due
process rights of the student in a classification dispute:
[E]ffective review of the decision requires both access to the school's records and
the opportunity to have the school's determination reviewed by an impartial
outside authority. Unless parents can examine test scores, psychological interview writeups, teacher recommendations and the like, the school's decision is
not only unchallengeable; it is simply incomprehensible. And unless the parents
can obtain the services of a disinterested professional, they may well lack the
competence to understand the basis of the school's action.
Kirp, supra note 50, at 788-89.

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

ness at the trial of his former codefendant and identified Perry as the
murderer. The trial court found that representation by the public
defender of both the witness and the accused created a conflict of interest, and had made the accused's attorney cognizant of information
that would otherwise have been unavailable to the defense.' The court,
seeking to protect the witness' attorney-client privilege, appointed
separate counsel for the witness and sharply restricted appellant's efforts to impeach the witness. Appellant's contempt conviction resulted
from his continued attempts to impeach Odums. 2 On appeal, the

Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and held, inter alia, that the
public defender is not automatically disqualified by the attorney-client
privilege from examining a witness who negotiates a plea and testifies
against his former codefendants.3
In Olds, the appellate court based its decision on the fact that
specific matters on which appellant attempted to impeach the witness
were not confidential, and hence not privileged. 4 The court recognized
that appellant had been placed in a most difficult position. 5 On one
hand, he was charged with representing his client zealously," and doing
so required him to attempt to discredit the critical prosecution witness.
On the other hand, appellant was bound to respect confidences gained
by the public defender's office during its initial representation of the
witness. 7 The court indicated the only proper course open to appellant,
so long as the public defender's office continued to represent the defendant, was to attempt to impeach the witness without revealing the
witness' confidences. 8 Such an approach offers one solution to a situation the court acknowledged was likely to recur under the public defender system.9 But Olds suggests that an attorney attempting to follow
such a course of action will encounter considerable practical difficulties
-especially when the defense attorney and judge disagree, as in Olds,
as to which impeaching material arises from the witness' confidences.
Such practical difficulties, and uncertainity as to how they will be re1. Olds v. State, 302 So. 2d 787, 788-89 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974). As to conflicting
interests, see note 34 infra.
2. 302 So. 2d at 789.
3. Id. at 792.
4. Id. at 790. The trial court had held the attorney-client privilege precluded proof
of such matters as prior statements of the witness made to or in the presence of third
parties, and the public record of the witness' plea. Id. As to the requirement of confidentiality, see note 17 and accompanying text infra.
5. 302 So. 2d at 791.
6. Id. See FLA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANONS 6, 7.
7. 302 So. 2d at 791. See FLA. CODE OF PROFEsSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANONS 4, 9.
8. 302 So. 2d at 792. Cf. Hutson v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 753 (Ct. App. 1962).
9. 302 So. 2d at 792.
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solved, will necessarily hamper the effectiveness of defense counsel and
impede the search for truth on which a defendant's liberty rests. The
question thus remains whether a former codefendant who turns state's
evidence after being sentenced for his role in the crime should ever be
able to use the attorney-client privilege as a shield against impeachment.10
The attorney-client privilege was recognized as early as the sixteenth century." Early cases justified the privilege on several grounds,
including the necessity for free disclosure of information by a client to
his attorney.' 2 Today, the common law attorney-client privilege is still
most often justified on the public policy postulate that persons seeking
legal aid should be able to communicate freely with their attorneys
without fear that their communications will be disclosed.13 The privilege is recognized as an exception to the general rule that requires all
persons to give complete and truthful testimony concerning matters
within their knowledge. 4
The common law attorney-client privilege is recognized in Florida. 15
10. A similar situation will result where one codefendant respresented by the public
defender is granted immunity and subsequently testifies in the trial of his former codefendant.
11. See, e.g., Kelway v. Kelway, 21 Eng. Rep. 47 (P.C. 1580); Berd v. Lovelace, 21
Eng. Rep. 33 (P.C. 1577).
12. E.g., in Annesley v. Angesea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1140, 1225 (Ex. 1743), it was
argued that (1)business required the privilege-people must be willing to trust "attornies" with their business affairs; (2) the privilege enables the attorney to adequately
represent the client by making it safe for the client to communicate freely to him; (3) the
attorney is identified with the client and, therefore, the attorney cannot be examined on
matters about which the client has no obligation to testify. See Noonan, The Purposes
of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1966).
13. See, e.g., Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (The attorney-client privilege
"is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice," that persons
seeking legal assistance be free to communicate with their attorney without fear of consequences or apprehension of disclosure.); United States v. Krlewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 79
(2d Cir. 1944) ("The justification for the privilege lies not in the fact of communication, but in the interest of the persons concerned that the subject matter should not
become public."); Modern Woodmen of America v. Watkins, 132 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1942),
citing Hunt v. Blackburn, supra; State v. Schroeder, 112 So. 2d 257, 261 (Fla. 1959)
("[N]either [the Florida Supreme] Court nor public policy favors either a prosecuting
officer or grand jury calling as a witness an attorney for one under investigation for commission of a crime, or an attorney testifying regarding any confidential communications
had with his client .... "); 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2291, at 545 (McNaughton rev.
1961).
14. Cafritz v. Koslow, 167 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
15. Keir v. State, 11 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1943). See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Parker, 62
So. 589 (Fla. 1913).
A claim of privilege does not conclusively establish it; rather, the party seeking disclosure has the burden of proving that the information sought is not, in fact, privileged.
Leithauser v. Harrison, 168 So. 2d 95, 97 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964). The proposed
Florida Evidence Code, Fla. H.R. 471 § 90.501 (1975), would abolish all common law
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However, the privilege is not absolute; it may sometimes be outweighed by the state's interest in the fair administration of justice. 6
The privilege applies to communications made in confidence 7 to a
legally certified attorney"' in the course of the attorney's professional
conduct.' 9 The privilege belongs to the client 20 and extends to communications between the attorney and client that21were made for the
purpose of securing professional legal aid or advice.
The client may at any time waive the privilege.2 2 It is not necessary
that the waiver be express. For example, there is an implied waiver if
the client voluntarily reveals the details of the communication with
the attorney. 23 Some jurisdictions have held that a witness waives the
privilege by voluntarily taking the stand and testifying about the subject matter of the communication made to the attorney.2 4 Florida, however, follows the general rule that a client does not waive the privilege
2
merely by becoming a witness and testifying in his own behalf. A
waiver has been recognized in some jurisdictions where an accomplice
2
turns state's evidence and testifies against his former codefendants.
privileges existing in Florida and make the creation of privileges dependent upon legislative action. The proposed Code contains a lawyer-client privilege in § 90.502.
16. Sepler v. State, 191 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
17. Wirtz v. Fowler, 372 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1966) (the common law attorney-client
privilege protects the disclosure of confidential information only); Wilcoxon v. United
States, 231 F.2d 384 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 943 (1956); Schetter v. Schetter.
239 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
18. Wartell v. Novograd, 137 A. 776 (R.I. 1927) (The privilege does not extend to a
law student, unless the student is acting as an agent of the attorney in a particular
transaction.). The proposed Florida Evidence Code, Fla. H.R. 471 § 90.502(l)(a) (1975),
would relax the common law requirement that the communication be made to a legally
certified attorney by defining a lawyer as "a person authorized, or reasonably believed by
the client to be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation."
19. Keir v. State, 11 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1943).
20. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888). However, the attorney may claim the
privilege on behalf of the client. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Parker, 62 So. 589 (Fla. 1913).
21. Herrin v. Abbe, 46 So. 183 (Fla. 1908).
22. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888). See Savino v. Luciano, 92 So. 2d 817
(Fla. 1957); Schetter v. Schetter, 239 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
23. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888); Sherman v. United States, 261 F. Supp.
522 (D. Hawaii 1966); Knaust Bros., Inc. v. Goldschlag, 34 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1939);
Kantaris v. Kantaris, 169 N.W.2d 824 (Iowa 1969).
24. See United States v. Pauldino, 487 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
981 (1974); Cleaves v. Kenney, 63 F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1933); People v. Riordan, 250 P.
190 (Cal. App. 1926); Young v. State, 65 Ga. 525 (1880); State v. Hector, 138 N.W. 930
(Iowa 1912); Bowers v. State, 29 Ohio St. 542 (1876); State v. Hoben, 102 P. 1000 (Utah
1909).
25. See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Parker, 62 So. 589 (Fla. 1913); State v. White, 19
Kan. 445 (1877); Jones v. State, 3 So. 379 (Miss. 1888); People v. Lynch, 244 N.E.2d 29
(N.Y. 1968); People v. Shapiro, 126 N.E.2d 559 (N.Y. 1955); State v. Pusch, 46 N.W.2d
508 (N.D. 1950).
26. See People v. Gallagher, 42 N.W. 1063, 1065 (Mich. 1889) ("[I]n the case of one
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Courts have also refused to recognize the privilege in civil cases involving a common attorney and multiple clients; 27 the rationale is that
communications in these cases lack the required element of cons
fidentiality.2
To meet the mandate of Gideon v. Wainwright,29 the public defender system was established in Florida.3 0 Under this system, rather
than select a particular attorney to represent an indigent, the court will
appoint the local public defender31 Since assistant public defenders act
who has admitted his connection with a crime, testifying against another as his accomplice,
not only the people, but the defense, are entitled to the whole story, and to all that the
witness has said or done in relation to the offense up to the time of the giving of his
testimony, including confidential communications to his attorney."); People v. Bortnik, 184
N.W.2d 275, 276 (Mich. App. 1970) ("[B]oth client and counsel may be compelled to disclose their confidential communications when the client turns state's evidence against a
codefendant."); Jones v. State, 3 So. 379 (Miss. 1888); People v. Patrick, 74 N.E. 843 (N.Y.
1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 602 (1906) (accomplice's voluntary testimony in a prosecution found to be the equivalent of an express waiver of the privilege). Contra, State v.
Hollins, 184 N.W.2d 676 (Iowa 1971) (codefendant's testimony for state after guilty
plea did not waive the privilege); Dunn v. Commonwealth, 350 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1961);
People v. Lynch, 244 N.E.2d 29 (N.Y. 1968).
27. See, e.g., Dominguez v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 56 So. 682, 683 (Fla. 1911)
("[W]here an attorney represents both or all the parties in a transaction, conversations
and transactions between such parties in the presence of the attorney and each other are
not privileged conversations, but such attorney may be required to testify to such conversations and communications .... "); Ogden v. Groves, 241 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1970); Hoffman v. Labutzke, 289 N.W. 652 (Wis. 1940). The privilege normally does
apply to litigation between persons who have retained a common attorney and others. See,
e.g., Grand Trunk W.R.R. v. H.W. Nelson Co., 116 F.2d 823, 835 (6th Cir. 1941)
("The rule is .. . that when two persons employ a lawyer as their common agent, their
communications to him as to strangers will be privileged.
); Hurlburt v. Hurlburt,
28 N.E. 651 (N.Y. 1891).
28. See, e.g., Petty v. Superior Court, 253 P.2d 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); Henke v.
Iowa Home Mutual Casualty Co., 87 N.W.2d 920 (Iowa 1958). But see Dominguez v.
Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 56 So. 682 (Fla. 1911) (communications made to common
attorney in absence of other party held to be privileged); Ogden v. Groves, 241 So. 2d
756 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970). The proposed Florida Evidence Code, Fla. H.R. 471
§ 90.502(4)(e) (1975), holds the privilege inapplicable to joint communications between
multiple parties and their common attorney in subsequent civil litigation between the
parties.
29. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Gideon established the basic right to counsel for indigents
accused of felonies. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions expanded this right. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to court-appointed counsel for indigents
during custodial interrogation); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (right to
counsel at post-indictment identification lineups); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967)
(right to counsel at probation revocation hearings); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972) (right to counsel reaches certain non-felony cases). But see Gerstein v. Pugh,
95 S. Ct. 854 (1975) (determination of probable cause to detain not a "critical stage"
in prosecution, and hence does not require appointment of counsel).
30. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 18; FLA. STAT. §§ 27.50-.59 (1973). FLA. STAT. § 925.035
(1973) permits the court to appoint private counsel in capital cases.
31. Corie v. State, 265 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Hammond v. State, 264
So. 2d 463 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
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as agents of the public defender,32 in legal effect multiple defendants
represented by the public defender's office are represented by a com33
mon attorney.
In the instant case the court declined to formulate a general rule
regarding the application of the attorney-client privilege in cases involving a common attorney and multiple criminal defendants. The
Olds court did state that the appointment of a new and independent
defense counsel for Perry would have alleviated the conflicting interests
presented, but noted the possible disadvantages visited upon a defendant by changing attorneys in mid-trial.3 4 The appointment of new
See FLA. CONsr. art. V, § 18.
1963 FLA. ATr'Y. GEN. Op. 063-105.
34. 302 So. 2d at 792. See Hutson v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 753 (Ct. App. 1962).
Although the Olds court did note the trial judge could have appointed independent
counsel for Perry, 302 So. 2d at 792, the court did not specifically refer to FLA. STAT.
§ 27.53(3) (1973), which provides:
(3) If at any time during the representation of two or more indigents the public
defender shall determine that the interests of those accused are so adverse or hostile
that they cannot all be counseled by the public defender or his staff without conflict of interest, or that none can be counseled by the public defender or his staff,
it shall be his duty to move the court to appoint one or more members of the
Florida bar who are in no way affiliated with the public defender in his capacity
as such, or in his private practice, to represent those accused. However, the trial
court shall appoint such other counsel upon its own motion when the facts developed upon the face of the record and files in the cause disclose such conflict ....
A failure to appoint new counsel where a conflict of interests exists may lead to the
reversal of a conviction. In Baker v. State, 202 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1967), the Florida Supreme
Court, citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), reversed the convictions of
codefendants who had been jointly represented by two court-appointed attorneys. The
court held that the appointment of joint counsel, over timely objections, "denied the
defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel promised by both our federal and
state constitutions." Id. at 566. The court's rationale was that effective representation by
the same counsel is made almost impossible by the conflicting interests and defenses of
most codefendants.
In Belton v. State, 217 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 915 (1969), the
court clarified the position it had taken in Baker:
If a defendant is indigent and [a request for separate counsel] is made it should be
granted unless it can be demonstrated to the trial judge that no prejudice will
result or that no conflict will arise as an incident of the joint representation. Without such a request being made, failure to appoint separate counsel will not be
held to constitute error unless it is demonstrated that prejudice results from such
failure.
217 So. 2d at 98.
See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); State v. Youngblood, 217 So. 2d 98
(Fla. 1968); Mitchell v. State, 213 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Note, Criminal
Codefendants and the Sixth Amendment: The Case for Separate Counsel, 58 GEO. L.J.
369 (1969).
The representation of multiple criminal defendants by a common attorney can also
result in ethical problems. See 1963 FLA. ATr'v. GEN. OP. 063-105 (it would not be ethically proper for a public defender to continue to represent four codefendants when two of
them have plead guilty and will probably turn state's evidence); 1965 FLA. A-r',. GEiN.
32.

33.
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counsel, however, would not alleviate the inherent unfairness fostered
by the attorney-client privilege in cases such as Olds; the defendant
would still be denied the use of the impeaching evidence possessed by
the public defender.
When confronted with a claim of common law privilege, a court
should initially look to the rationale behind the privilege to determine
its applicability. Wigrnore recognized the need to evaluate the reason
for the privilege before applying it:
[T]he privilege remains an exception to the general duty to disclose.
Its benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain
and concrete. . . . It is worth preserving for the sake of a general
policy, but it is nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of the
truth. It ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible
limits consistent with the logic of its principle. 35
The reason most often given for the attorney-client privilege is that
the privilege encourages free disclosure and consultation between the
attorney and client.3 6 This reason, without more, does not justify the
recognition of the attorney-client privilege in cases such as Olds. As a
7
Florida court noted in Sepler v. State,8
The question [as to whether a communication should be shielded
from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege] requires a balancing
of the interests, on the one hand as to the attorney and client in their
right to the protection of the privilege, and on the other hand in the
public and the state for the proper administration of law and
justice.38
There is no valid reason for the application of the privilege
cases similar to Olds. Having been adjudged guilty and sentenced
his involvement in the crime, an individual who testifies against
former codefendant has little need to retain the privilege? 9 If

in
for
his
his

Op. 065-15; FLA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 5-14 to -20;

FLA. BAR PROFESSIONAL ETHICS COMM. OPINIONS, No. 72-50 (1973) ("A lawyer may not
properly represent multiple clients in the same criminal case where proper representation of any one client would include efforts to obtain immunity."); id. No. 67-37 (1968).
35. 8 J. WIGMORlE, EVIDENCE § 2291, at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
36. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
37. 191 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
38. Id. at 590.
39. Generally, the attorney-client privilege survives the attorney-client relationship.
See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Parker, 62 So. 589, 590 (Fla. 1913); ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 4.
If the privilege were held inapplicable. in a case similar to Olds the witness would
still be afforded the protection of the fifth amendment's double jeopardy and self-in-
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testimony elaborates his role in the crime, he will not be brought to
trial again. 40 Were a waiver of the privilege to be uniformly applied in
these situations, it is doubtful that it would have a chilling effect on
communications between a client and his attorney. A defendant is unlikely to be deterred from freely disclosing information to his attorney
by the speculative possibility that his true role in the crime might be
crimination provisions. See Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931). In Alford, the
Court stated "[N]o obligation is imposed on the court . . . to protect a witness from being
discredited on cross-examination, short of an attempted invasion of his constitutional
protection from self-incrimination, properly invoked." Id. at 694 (emphasis added).
Counsel should be available to advise the witness on the use of the fifth amendment's
prohibition against compelled self-incrimination. The utilization of this provision would
be necessary if the cross-examiner sought to inquire into areas not covered by the double
jeopardy provision. Cf. State v. Craig, 257 A.2d 737 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1969). These constitutional safeguards would protect the penal interests of the witness while still permitting an effective cross-examination by defense counsel.
An entirely different situation arises where the witness testifies for the state prior to
sentencing. Such a witness needs the privilege. United States ex rel. Platts v.
Myers, 253 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Pa. 1966), involved the representation of multiple defendants by a single, court-appointed attorney. Two of the defendants pled guilty and,
prior to sentencing, testified for the state at the trial of their codefendant. He was
found guilty. In granting his petition for habeas corpus, the court held that his sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel had been violated.
[Petitioner's attorney] was thus in a very awkward position. On the one hand his
job was to present the best possible case for the petitioner, and this involved the
impeachment of his other two clients who were witnesses for the Commonwealth.
On the other hand, he also had the task of protecting them. Since the Court had
deferred their sentencing until after petitioner's trial, it seems obvious that the
severity of their sentences depended in large measure on their testimony against
the relator and their general cooperation with the prosecution. If the attorney had
succeeded in impeaching these two witnesses for the relator's benefit, he would
have destroyed the effectiveness of their testimony and thus vitiated the very
factor that would have weighed heavily in their favor when they came up for
sentencing. No attorney could have effectively advocated both these positions
simultaneously.
Id. at 24-25. See People v. Ware, 233 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. 1968); Kent v. State, 273 A.2d 819
(Md. Ct. App. 1971); State v. Ebinger, 234 A.2d 233 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967). See also United
States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952); Commonwealth v. Smith, 291 N.E.2d 607 (Mass.
1973).
40. In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the Supreme Court found the
double jeopardy prohibition of the fifth amendment applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. Where the witness' testimony would expose him to prosecution for crimes other than those covered by the double jeopardy clause, the witness may
protect his interest by invoking the fifth amendment's self-incrimination provision. See
note 39 supra. These constitutional provisions would not, of course, prevent impeachment that compromises nonpenal interests of the witness. However, the witness' primary
interest in application of the attorney-client privilege presumably is the maintenance of
confidences that could lead to criminal prosecution or affect sentencing decisions. And
even if the witness has significant nonpenal interests that will be compromised in the
course of impeachment, application of the attorney-client privilege to bar impeachment
and thereby protect those interests arguably violates the confrontation clause. See notes
45-46 and accompanying text infra.
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discovered if, after being convicted and sentenced, he turns state's
evidence and thereby waives the privilege. In these circumstances
the only practical effect of the attorney-client privilege is the denial of
highly relevant impeaching evidence to the defendant on trial.
Wigmore suggested four conditions which he felt should be met
before granting communications a privilege against disclosure:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
41
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
These conditions could also be used to evaluate the propriety of allowing a recognized privilege to be invoked under particular circumstances.
If Wigmore's criteria are applied to a claim of privilege made by a
witness testifying against a former codefendant, it would appear that
recognition of the privilege is inappropriate. Assuming that the first
three conditions are met, attention should then be focused on the
fourth. The benefit to be gained from the correct disposal of a case
similar to Olds is certainly greater than any injury which might inure
to the relationship between the public defender and the former codefendant who has turned state's evidence. The relationship between the former codefendant and the public defender's office will, in
reality, have ended by the time he is called upon to testify.
When confronted with a situation involving testimony of an accomplice who had turned state's evidence, the Mississippi Supreme
Court in Jones v. State42 recognized the very real danger in withholding information under a claim of attorney-client privilege:
[The accomplice's] testimony comes in such a questionable shape that
it should, in the interest of truth and justice, be subjected to the
severest scrutiny, and acted on with the greatest caution. There is no
case in which cross-examination is more desirable or important to
test the credit of a witness than that in which one man is seeking to
save his own life or liberty by swearing away the life or liberty of
others.
...
[The accomplice] has no right to claim any privilege concerning
any of the facts pertinent to the issue .

.

. He thereby waives all

41. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
42. 3 So. 379 (Miss. 1888). Unlike the situation in Olds, in Jones the witness was still
subject to prosecution at the time of his accomplice's trial.
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privileges . . . against disclosing communications between himself
and his counsel touching the offense charged .... The reason for
maintaining such privilege ceases when one has voluntarily exposed
himself by his own testimony to the very consequences from which
it was intended by the privilege to protect him. To preserve such
privilege in such case would be worse than vain, for, while it could
not help the witness, it might, by withholding the only means of
contradicting and impeaching him, operate with the greatest in43
justice towards the party on trial.
Not only is the privilege unnecessary in a situation similar to Olds,
but its application may very well result in a denial of the defendant's
sixth amendment right of confrontation. Last year, in Davis v. Alaska,4 4
the Supreme Court dealt with a situation analogous to Olds. Petitioner
had been charged with larceny and burglary. At trial a protective order
was issued prohibiting petitioner's attorney from questioning the key
prosecution witness concerning his probationary status as a juvenile
delinquent. This information would have been helpful in impeaching
the witness by indicating the possibility of prejudice and ulterior
motives for his testimony. In reversing the conviction, the Court held:
The State's policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender's record cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an ad45
verse witness.
Applying the rationale of Davis to the instant case, it is difficult to
imagine that the state's interest in the unnecessary application of the
attorney-client privilege would somehow outweigh the "vital [sixth
amendment] right" of "effective cross-examination."

Recently, in Oregon v. Hass,46 the Court stated that "[w]e are, after
all, always engaged in a search for truth in a criminal case so long as
the search is surrounded with the safeguards provided by our Constitu45. Id. at 380.
44. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
45. Id. at 320. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Smith v. Illinois,
390 U.S. 129 (1968); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931). In Chambers the Court
stated:
[T]he right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal
trial process. . . . But its denial or significant diminution calls into question the
ultimate "'integrity of the fact-finding process"' and requires that the competing
interest be closely examined.
410 U.S. at 295 (emphasis added).
46. 95 S.Ct. 1215 (1975).
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tion." 4 7 The application of the attorney-client privilege, in cases similar
to Olds, is a very real obstacle to that search for truth.
HENRY

E. DAVIS

47. Id. at 1221. In Haas, the Court dealt with statements obtained from a defendant in
a manner that violated his fifth amendment right, as interpreted by Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), to be free from compelled self-incrimination. Applying the principles
of Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the Court held that while the statements
were inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief, they were admissible for impeachment purposes.
[T]he impeaching material would provide valuable aid to the jury in assessing the
defendant's credibility .... [T]he shield provided by Miranda is not to be perverted
to a license to testify inconsistently, or even perjuriously, free from the risk of
confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.
95 S. Ct. at 1221.
If impeachment is so vital to the truth-seeking process as to limit application of a
constitutional rule of exclusion, it should also limit the attorney-client privilege-a mere
rule of evidence-in a case such as Olds. It may be argued that Olds is not analogous to
Harris and Hass because of the deterrence issues in the latter cases. But Olds, like Harris
and Hass, presents a situation in which initial conduct is unlikely to be affected substantially by the possibility that an impeachment effort will subsequently be made.

